By Simon Hukin:

There comes a time in the life of every columnist when they feel compelled to rant – to turn the supreme ego-stroking power that is guaranteed column inches or website space to an unexpurgated, unbridled outpouring of ire. I’m afraid, reader, this is my time. I am presently sitting on a plane in Perth airport, waiting for the damn thing to taxi and take off so I can begin the long  journey back to the land of intrigue and electioneering.

Thanks to my work I fly a great deal and have breezing through check-in down to a fine art; check-in online about two hours before the gates open so the lie of the land is clear but there’s still a chance of securing a row of seats to one’s self; arrive at the airport ten minutes before bag-drop closes – just in time to hear the airline’s staff open extra kiosks for my flight as it’s about to begin boarding, thus shortening the lines to nothing; ensure combined baggage weighs precisely 22.9kg and no more; and dress well so as to have the best chance of a free upgrade (a not uncommon pleasure on emptier flights). Proceed to security.

Security. The bane of my existence – a worthless, time consuming, and often costly set of procedures which serve only to waste time, annoy people and inspire the unfounded fear of terrorism in a populace primed by such rubbish as Today Tonight, A Current Affair and bad Hollywood films. I don’t begrudge the guards their work – a job’s a job, and if they weren’t doing it, someone else would be. Well, that’s not true. I do begrudge some of them, those that seem to particularly relish their duties – especially those wand waving fiends manning the gas-chromatograph, who seem magically attracted to me. However, my real problem is with the job itself.

Security screening at airports doesn’t work. No matter how many million nail files and cans of deodorant they confiscate each year, no matter how many bags are screened or wands waved these security protocols will not stop (and did not stop, cf. 9/11) anyone determined to commit an act of terrorism on a plane. Even the various air-marshal programs – the extension of in-airport security procedures – don’t work. The USA has the most extensive air-marshalcy of any country in the world; they spend over a billion dollars a year on their sky-police, and you know what their average arrest rate is per annum? 4. Their program began in 1969, and has increased in cost and scope every year since. Those who support air-marshals often come out with the hackneyed line “even one terrorist arrested, even one life saved, is worth it.” Whether this is true or not, it doesn’t really matter. Those arrested by air-marshals are very rarely taken into custody on a terrorism related charge. If not terrorism, then what? Violence? Smuggling? Hijacking? Indecent exposure? No. Drunk and disorderly behaviour. It costs the United States government $200million per arrest, and they’re arresting drunks. Maybe, instead of spending so much money on air-marshalcy, governments internationally could agree to ban alcohol on planes? They’ve done it with cigarettes, mobile phones, and nail files, why not liquor?

But I digress. The main purpose of my rant is to demonstrate (beyond a shadow of a doubt, as my high school debating teacher liked to say) that security screening of the kind we have now is worthless almost beyond words. This is not that difficult a task. First, to the metal detectors through which we all must pass.
Many a time have I wandered through a detector with enough hard metal on my person to be a flick knife, and even, on some occasions a pocket or snub revolver. Many a time have I carried large objects made from sharpened plastic through them. The result? Nary a beep. I know of people who have carried up to two kilos of plastics of similar makeup as Composition C explosives (to such an extent that they show up on trace-detection gas-chromatographs as RDX) and have bags crammed with electronics which could easily be fashioned by skilled hands into an EBW or slapper detonator. Zilch.

For every machete revealed, they confiscate a thousand letter openers. For every Stanley trimmer, a hundred pairs of tweezers. It simply doesn’t work. Yet beyond that, its effects can even be counterproductive. Far from deterring the threat of terrorism, greater security can be seen as an inducement to attack – a potential target under heavy guard is seen as more important, and more valuable than a lightly guarded one. Furthermore, terrorists demonstrating the ability to overcome great odds, and rigorous security, in order to launch an attack on an aeroplane or airport can only lead to greater panic – making those airports with higher security far more tempting targets.

It has been put to me that the purpose of these airport security systems – as they patently fail in their most obvious role – is to make those flying (or considering aviation) feel more secure. This, to me, seems absurd. The existence of security systems in our airports is a constant and highly publicized reminder that we all have something to fear – especially in the air – and that we need to have security in a futile attempt to guard us from it.

The restrictions placed upon speech in airports (you know what I mean – where one is hushed into silence when one cracks a joke about bombs or terrorism, and one has to fear arrest by overzealous policemen if one dares to talk about the possibility of bypassing their security systems) also contribute to the victory of terrorism in airports. These restrictions cause more unease and wariness in the minds of airport patrons than free speech would. Indeed, it should be perfectly fine to joke about terrorism, anywhere, any time – being able to laugh in the face of the bomber or hijacker is the greatest victory: ridiculing them undermines the purpose of their activities and demonstrates the resilience of society even when faced with the gravest of threats.

There is, of course, a way to ‘fix’ airport security – to ensure it is effective in detecting all possible weapons being taken aboard planes. It’s fairly simple. It’s the paper suit method – total, complete screenings: everything is searched, people must strip and change into paper suits and pass through x-ray scanners. Some even go so far as to advocate mandatory cavity searches. For me this is a bridge too far.

Not only would it be a huge inconvenience (and see airport arrival times blow out to between two and four hours prior to departure for domestic, short-haul flights), it represents the triumph of fear – absolute victory for terrorism, which thrives on the repression of societies and removal of freedoms. In the words of Benjamin Franklin “those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”

But even beyond that fundamental concern, the costs of implementing such extreme measures are astronomical. It costs us well over half a billion dollars per annum simply to provide the paltry screening services we have at present. The government recently announced a $200 million dollar boost to airport security to implement shallow x-ray scanners on flights to the United States, and if this were to go further the costs would explode to well over $1.5billion per annum. The costs of such a rigorous upgrade are almost terrifying in and of themselves. Even if we accept that we can undertake these costs, we must ask what return we can expect on our investment. What return does the present system provide? In reality, next to none. Jobs, some may say, but no more than 1,500 jobs around the nation. Safety? Hardly. As previously shown the net effect to passenger security is negative. We may, notionally, save one or two planeloads every five years – though there’s no real evidence of this. With the new system, that might increase by a plane or two.

But consider the opportunity cost, as my economist friends would say. What else could we spend our money on? Indigenous health, education, eradicating homelessness, or funding research into sustainable energy (imagine what the CSIRO could do with an extra $1.5b per annum). Indeed, surely more lives could be saved by investing in tackling real problems of our nation – eradicating poverty, funding research into cures for pandemics, and improving service provision in disadvantaged areas. According to the equivalent of a jumbo load of Australians die every week from smoking related illnesses, maybe addressing smoking is a more worthy investment?  Hell, we could even spend it addressing the root causes of terrorism, rather than focusing on the symptoms as we do now – we could improve education and health care in the developing world, invest in raising up those living in depressed areas at home, and focus on fostering social inclusion from birth for everyone.

The system we have doesn’t work. “Fixing it” is both unconscionable and too expensive. We ought, at least, to put the funds we waste on airport security to use somewhere they might actually save lives, rather than just frighten and annoy the innocent.

N.B. I’m not against Customs and Excise. Customs is good.

Simon Hukin is a student at the Australian National University, General Secretary of the Western Australian Secondary Students’ Association, peripatetic music teacher and general curmudgeon. He is heavily involved in politics and the union movement.

Tags: airport security, australia terrorist, security aeroplane, terrorist, war on terror